Security protocols in sensor networks - Revision history

80.185.147.212 at 10:39, 22 February 2005

2005-02-22T10:39:43Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:39, 22 February 2005
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	==Work in progress!==

	==Applications for sensor networks==		==Applications for sensor networks==
	Sensor networks can become useful in a variety of applications:		Sensor networks can become useful in a variety of applications:

80.185.147.212 at 10:39, 22 February 2005

2005-02-22T10:39:17Z

@@ Line 32: / Line 32: @@
 	</tr>
 </table>
 Sensors form a self-organizing wireless network with a multihop routing topology. A prototype network consists of a couple of nodes and a more powerful base station.
 The base station is connected to an outside network. Small batteries work as the energy source for the nodes.
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 This protocol is used to authenticate the origin of received data. &micro;TESLA introduces asymmetry through a delayed (symmetric) key disclosure.
 It requires that base station and nodes are loosely time synchronized and each node knows an upper bound on maximum synchronization error.
-For authenticated packets, the base station computes a mac with a (at this time) secret key. A node can verify that the mac key was not yet disclosed
+For authenticated packets, the base station computes a mac with a (at this time) secret key. A node can verify that the mac key was not yet disclosed based on the clock, synchronization error and time schedule) and stores the packet in buffer.
 Each mac key is part of a key chain generated by a public one-way function F. The sender chooses the last key of the chain randomly and repeatedly applies F to compute all other keys:
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 current time, a key of the key chain used in a past interval, starting time of interval i, duration of a time interval and the disclosure delay.
-*4. Authenticating broadcast packets: The receiver needs to be sure that a packet is safe (not altered), i.e. the sender did not yet disclose
+*4. Authenticating broadcast packets: The receiver needs to be sure that a packet is safe (not altered), i.e. the sender did not yet disclose the key used to compute the mac of an incoming packet. Unsafe packets will be dropped. For safe packets, first the newly received keys, then the packets have to be authenticated. The old key will be replaced with the new key.
 *5. Nodes broadcasting authenticated data:
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 ==Implementation==
 ==Evaluation==
 ==References==

80.185.145.63 at 20:48, 20 February 2005

2005-02-20T20:48:33Z

@@ Line 68: / Line 68: @@
 ===SNEP===
 ===&micro;TESLA===
 ==Implementation==

80.185.145.63 at 17:38, 20 February 2005

2005-02-20T17:38:20Z

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 ==Applications for sensor networks==
 ==Limits of sensor networks==
 ==System assumptions==
 ==Design guidelines==
 ==SPINS==
 ===SNEP===

Rkaiser at 15:26, 20 February 2005

2005-02-20T15:26:13Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:26, 20 February 2005
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	===SNEP===		===SNEP===

	===µTESLA===		===µTESLA===

	==Implementation==		==Implementation==

Rkaiser at 15:24, 20 February 2005

2005-02-20T15:24:58Z

New page

==Under construction! Text will follow soon.==

==Applications for sensor networks==

==Limits of sensor networks==

==System assumptions==

==Design guidelines==

==SPINS==

===SNEP===

===µTESLA===

==Implementation==

==Evaluation==

==References==