Safe and fast SSL/TLS-handshake

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Motivation

- unsecured channels subject to data exposure to third parties
- ightharpoonup securing of data channel needed ightarrow SSL/TLS
- method of attributing identities to identity holders needed
- method of signaling cessation of identity usage needed
- ➤ x509/CRL (RFC 5280) and OCSP (RFC 6960) for identity handling/verification
- different methods of establishing secure channel

History

- ▶ 1994 SSL 1.0 concept
- ▶ 1995 SSL 2.0 first release (RFC 6101), MD5-hashing, one key for auth/enc, depr. 2011 (RFC 6176)
- ▶ 1996 SSL 3.0 (RFC 6101) subject to POODLE-attack (CVE-2014-3566¹), depr. 2014 (RFC 7568)
- ▶ 1999 TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), depr. 2021 (RFC 8996)
- ▶ 2006 TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), protection against CBC-atacks, depr. 2022
- ▶ 2008 TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), replaced MD5/SHA-1, algo selection mechanism
- ➤ 2018 TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446), defaults to AES256_GCM_SHA384, insecure algos removed, changed handshake/connection init
- ⇒ currently two productive versions


¹https://security.googleblog.com/2014/10/this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html

Structure of TLS



TLSv1.2 handshake

Structure of TLS



TLSv1.3 handshake

TLSv1.3

- only AES and ChaCha20 as cipher
 - \longrightarrow in total 5 options
- ▶ only Diffie-Hellman (incl./excl. elliptic curves)
- ▶ no (downgrade)renegotiation anymore

Performance considerations

different ciphers

▶ software based, ChaCha20 is up to 9x faster

| type | 2 bytes | 31 bytes | 136 bytes | 1024 bytes | 8192 bytes | 16384 bytes |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| AES-256-GCM (Software) | 3912.58k | 43681.83k | 119433.57k | 220805.46k | 240091.14k | 241401.86k |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 (Software) | 5406.06k | 79034.59k | 256344.41k | 1439373.99k | 2491817.98k | 2634612.74k |

Performance considerations

hardware acceleration

- ► AES with CPU-support performs best
- also faster than ChaCha20
- ▶ not available on all CPU/with all compilers/with all software


| type | 2 bytes | 31 bytes | 136 bytes | 1024 bytes | 8192 bytes | 16384 bytes |
|--------------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| AES-256-GCM (Software) | 3912.58k | 43681.83k | 119433.57k | 220805.46k | 240091.14k | 241401.86k |
| AES-256-GCM (CPU-instructions) | 12352.14k | 156771.30k | 600536.56k | 2364060.33k | 3829205.67k | 4008596.82k |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 (Software) | 5406.06k | 79034.59k | 256344.41k | 1439373.99k | 2491817.98k | 2634612.74k |

Performance considerations

SSL offloading

- ► three options
 - 1. software based (user level)
 - 2. kTLS (kernel level)
 - 3. NIC-offload (fully managed by hardware)
- should improve throughput due to less context switches
 - ! may introduce operational problems
 - ? possible issues with TCP-checksum on IPv6
 - size limits
 - issues with network-mounted resources
- ► impact questionable

Performance



 10^{3} 10² 101 proto,Cipher,Alg,kTLS

Raspberry Pi 4, 500 parallel connections

how to: fast and safe TLS handshake

- disable old ciphers
- ~ OCSP
 - ! Let's Encrypt removes OCSP soon
- ∼ OCSP-Stapling
 - ! Chrome ignores CRL or OCSP, only knows of revoked certificate if stapled result
- use elliptic curve for keys
- use LARGE packages
- SSL offloading (e.g. Nvidia ConnectX-7 for 400G connections)

Caveats

